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There is no lack of textbooks on the political and economic history of 
the People's Republic of China. Some of the more commonly used texts 
among students and scholars include Kenneth Lieberthal's Governing 
China: From Revolution Through Reform; Tony Saich's Governance and 
Politics of China; and June Teufel Dreyer's China's Political System: Mod-
ernization and Tradition. Ezra Vogel's monumental Deng Xiaoping and 
the Transformation of China, although written as a biography of Deng 
Xiaoping, is in fact also a detailed historical account of the PRC's eco-
nomic and political development. Walder's new book explicitly covers 
the Mao period and leaves out the Deng era. This is done deliberately 
in order to focus the book in terms of time period and a speciﬁc series 
of social and political events.
The book contains a preface and 14 chapters, dealing with issues and 
themes such as from movement to regime, rural and urban revolution, 
the Socialist economy, the evolving Party system, the Great Leap For-
ward, the Cultural Revolution, and so forth.  The strength of the book is 
its comparative perspective, it views developments in China in the light 
of Soviet attempts to establish a socialist society. For example, Chapter 
5, which deals with the socialist economy, shows that in many areas 
the Chinese implemented the Soviet blueprint so thoroughly that their 
policies and practices came to reﬂect textbook socialist ideals more fully 
than in the Soviet Union itself. 
Walder argues that Mao's China was deﬁned by two distinct insti-
tutions that both were established during the 1950s: a Party system 
exercising strict discipline and a socialist economy modelled after that 
of the Soviet Union. He discusses state socialism as a growth machine 
and shows how the drivers of the economy in this system are not mar-
ket demand and ﬁnancial markets, but rather mandatory planning and 
high investment rates. He also describes China's industrial system and 
industrial management by comparing them with the Soviet model.
Chapter 6,'The Evolving Party System', is also useful.  Walder, based 
on his training as a historical sociologist, once again frames develop-
ments in the context of the basic elements of the state socialist system 
as it evolved in the Soviet Union. The chapter contains informed dis-
cussions of political surveillance, Party recruitment, Party reach, class 
categories and family origin, political loyalty and career advancement, 
power and privilege, etc.  Here Walder draws not only on extant lit-
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erature on Party history and building, but also on his own extensive 
sociological research. 
Chapters on major political and social campaigns such as the 
antirightist movement of 1957, the Great Leap Forward of 1958-60 and 
the Cultural Revolution of 1966-69 form the core of the book.  In the 
three chapters about the Cultural Revolution (chapters 10-12), Walder 
is able to draw on his own research on the Cultural Revolution and 
the red guard movements.  Walder presents a story of constant battle 
between various student factions and worker rebel groups encouraged 
by Mao and the Cultural Revolutionary Group to smash the existing 
power structures. The result is widespread chaos in Chinese cities and 
the breakdown of social order. In the end Mao decides to bring in the 
army in order to bring the red guards and worker rebels under control. 
Thus what started as a rebellion against the authorities, ends as military 
rule.  However, the military becomes too strong, even for Mao, and after 
defence minister and heir apparent Lin Biao's alleged coup against Mao 
in September 1979, the old chairman decides to bring back many of the 
senior Party leaders whom he purged during the Cultural Revolution. 
Chief among these rehabilitated cadres is Deng Xiaoping.
Scholars have  often debated what the Cultural Revolution was all 
about and why it was launched. To Walder the answer is clear. The Cul-
tural Revolution was carefully planned by Mao, who wanted to shake 
up, if not smash, existing power structures, purging former colleagues 
and comrades-in-arms in the process.  Once he had moved loyalists into 
control of the levers of national power, Mao was ready to make his move 
in the spring of 1966. Even though Mao might have been motivated by 
ideological goals and a desire to save the purity of his revolution, the 
result was political power struggle and intense factional inﬁghting.
Walder is extremely critical of Mao's revolutionary theories and politi-
cal practice. He describes the chairman as a dogmatic thinker who clung 
to orthodox ideas that even Stalin had long abandoned.  He calls him 'a 
rigidly dogmatic leader with extremely narrow and outdated ideas' (p. 
341).  Walder does not deny that some modest economic accomplishments 
were achieved during the Mao era, but he argues that these accomplish-
ments 'were offset by enormous human costs' (p. 333). The largest of 
these costs was the death through starvation of 30 million people during 
the famine caused by the Great Leap Forward. Millions more died  as a 
result of violent campaigns against 'reactionaries' and other bad elements, 
culminating in the Cultural Revolution.
In Walder's opinion, Mao's role and impact is summed up as 'a revolu-
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tion derailed', which is in fact the subtitle of the book.  The only credit he 
is willing to offer Mao is that his reluctance to compromise with Chiang 
Kai-shek, and to press relentlessly for victory in the civil war instead, 
paid off. Stalin and many of Mao's close associates advised negotiation, 
whereas Mao was convinced that he would be able to win ultimate vic-
tory on the battleﬁeld. This proved to be correct and was instrumental 
in giving Mao tremendous prestige and an aura of infallibility, which 
he would subsequently (mis)use.
It is not my intention to defend Mao and his role in the Chinese revo-
lution. However, totally discrediting him causes problems.  If Mao was 
totally wrong, why was he never subject to the kind of criticism Stalin 
was subject to in the Soviet Union? During the Third Plenary Session 
in December 1978 and authoritatively in the 1981 'Resolution on Party 
History' document,  Mao was criticized for his mistakes in his later years 
and especially for his role in the Cultural Revolution. But even though the 
door was open, the criticism never developed into a sustained campaign 
against the chairman.  One reason is of course that many of the leaders 
who took over after Mao, including Deng Xiaoping, shared some of the 
responsibility for the Great Leap Forward and other events leading to the 
Cultural Revolution. In 1989, they showed the world that they also would 
not hesitate to use force when power over the country was at stake.
Mao is still revered in China today.  One might argue that this reverence 
is necessary in order to uphold the Party's legitimacy. However, I am not 
sure this is the only reason.  Mao's great accomplishment in the eyes of 
many Chinese is that he freed China from foreign oppression and made 
China stand up. This contribution will continue to be acknowledged in-
dependently of the continued existence or withering away of the Chinese 
Communist Party.
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